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RISK ALLOCATION IN TRANSPORT 
PUBLIC SERVICE CONTRACTS
The aim of this paper is to analyse the risks that are the subject of pu-
blic service contracts for providing public passenger services and to express 
their impact on Þ nancing transport services from the position of public aut-
horities. The paper veriÞ es a hypothesis that the most advantageous con-
tract from the position of public authorities is a net cost contract. Under this 
contract type, public authorities take no risks related to providing transport 
services. The paper also analyses the risks that arise during transport ser-
vice provision. The risks are divided into cost and revenue risks. The paper 
proposes a procedure for quantiÞ cation of cost and revenue risks and it pro-
vides a model calculation in the conditions of the Slovak Republic. The paper 
also highlights the bottlenecks in the conclusion of individual contract types 
from the position of public authorities.
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1. Introduction
According to Beck (2011), the majority of public passenger transport services 
cannot be provided on a commercial basis within Member States of the European 
Union. Public authorities must ensure transport service provision even in the time 
of low demand particularly in the evenings and at the weekends (Hensher and 
Stanley, 2003). According to Poliak et al. (2012), the aim of transport service-
ability is to provide inhabitants with the satisfaction of their basic transport needs 
such as travelling to work, schools or health care facilities. Furthermore, Wallis 
et al. (2010) and Zhanbirov and Kenzhegulova (2012) noted that it is necessary to 
provide public transport services with regard to social and environmental factors. 
Thus, it is also necessary to provide special tariff conditions for particular groups 
of passengers such as pupils, students and pensioners who have no other options of 
transportation than public passenger transport. This requires the support of public 
passenger transport from public funds.
In 2007, Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 came into force and it is valid 
throughout the European Union (EU). It regulates the conditions of providing and 
Þ nancing public transport services in the EU Member States. According to this 
legislation, a direct award of public service contracts is possible in rail and road 
transport in the case of an internal operator (a public service operator is owned by 
a public authority). The direct award of the contracts is also possible if the follow-
ing restrictions are observed. The Þ rst restriction is that the average annual value 
of public service contracts is estimated to be less than 1 000 000 € or the public 
service contracts concern the annual provision of less than 300 000 kilometres of 
public passenger transport services. According to the second restriction, the limit 
of 1 000 000 € increases up to 2 000 000 € per year and the limit of 300 000 ki-
lometres increases up to 600 000 kilometres per year only in the case of the direct 
award of contracts to a small or medium-sized enterprise which does not operate 
more than 23 vehicles. In all other cases, public authorities are obligated to ensure 
transport service provision through a competitive tendering.
According to Poliak et al. (2014), the public authorities from Central Europe 
countries do not have enough experience with either public procurement of trans-
port services or determination of the service operator’s remuneration depending 
on the risk which is assumed by the operator. Despite the fact that Regulation (EC) 
No. 1370/2007 requires the remuneration which would depend on the level of risk-
taking, Poliak (2013) pointed out that remuneration determined as percentage of 
the costs is often included in the existing public service contracts. For example, in 
Slovakia up to 2014, the reasonable proÞ t of a service operator is determined in 
the range from 3.5 to 5.0 % of the economically justiÞ ed costs (Kilianová, 2012, 
Semanová, 2014). In Hungary, the public service contract, concluded between the 
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operator and the public authority (Budapest city), contains provisions under which 
a level of the reasonable proÞ t is a maximum of 4 % of economically justiÞ ed 
costs1. On the other hand, in the Czech Republic, a new Decree No. 296/2010 was 
adopted in 20102 and it stipulates a level of the reasonable proÞ t at maximum level 
of 7.5 % of operating assets per year. 
There are public authorities that still do not take into account the risk as-
sumed by a service operator when determining remuneration in Central Europe 
countries. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse the risks related to public 
service provision. It is necessary to quantify the risk when determining remunera-
tion depending on the risk. 
The second section of the paper analyses the risks associated with the public 
transport service provision. The risks are classiÞ ed and divided according to sev-
eral aspects. The third section of the paper deals with the allocation of the risks be-
tween contractual parties in public passenger transport – the public authority and 
service operator. It explains three different contract types depending on the risk 
allocation. As the authors of the paper did not Þ nd a methodology from available 
resources for risk quantiÞ cation in public service contracts, they have proposed 
their own methodology in the fourth section. The methodology is applicable in 
determining operator’s remuneration.
A contract under which an operator assumes all the risks (cost risks as well as 
revenue risks) may appear to be the most advantageous from the position of public 
authorities. The contract is called a net cost contract. The authors of the paper 
deal with a mathematical model of the operators’ approach when assuming cost 
and revenue risks. The model is derived from microeconomic theory. The paper 
veriÞ es the hypothesis that a net cost contract is the most advantageous from the 
position of public authorities.
 
2.  Analysis of the Risks Affecting the Financing of Public Passenger 
Transport
Risks arising from business as well as provision of public transport services 
can be classiÞ ed according to various aspects. According to Valach (2001), the 
risks can be classiÞ ed as systematic risks and non-systematic risks. The systematic 
risks include political risks (government policy changes), economic risks (changes 
1 City bus service contract between the operator of BKV and the city of Budapest, 2008
2 Decree No 296/2010 Coll. on procedures for compiling the Þ nancial model and determining 
the maximum amount of compensation (CZ)
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in prices, spending power of the population), changes in interest rates, and etc. The 
non-systematic risks are associated with the revenue of an enterprise and its abil-
ity to settle obligations. Dubovická, Varcholová (2008) distinguish risks according 
to the factors which cause those risks such as: technical risks, operational risks, 
Þ nancial risks, and policy risks. 
Also, several other authors deal with the risks and their distribution between 
a service operator and public authority, e. g.  Stanley and van de Velde (2008), 
Hensher and Stanley (2003) and van de Velde et al. (2008a). In authors’ opinion, 
division of the risks into two groups, cost and revenue risks, is most advantageous 
for formation of public service contracts (Figure 1).
Figure 1
CLASSIFICATION OF THE RISKS AFFECTING 
THE REASONABLE PROFIT
Source: Stanley and van de Velde (2008a)
2.1. Cost Risks
Cost risks are related to the cost calculation when concluding public service 
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price for performance realization in public service contracts. The price consists of 
the costs and proÞ t of the service operator. When service operators assume cost 
risks, it is necessary to determine a range of performance that should be realized 
during the contract period and economically justiÞ ed costs per unit of the perfor-
mance in public service contracts. The cost risks can be divided by van de Velde et 
al. (2008b) into two groups: operational risks and residual value risks.
Operational cost risks are the risks that are related to the difference of the 
expected costs and the actually observed costs after performance realization. The 
reasonable proÞ t must depend on the allocation of these risks. When the opera-
tor does not assume these risks and after realization of performance he proves 
eligibility of the costs to the public authority for the purpose of compensation, the 
operator takes no cost risk for the performance realization. According to Lalive 
and Schmutzler (2008a), in the case that the agreed unit costs in a public service 
contract are Þ nal, the operator assumes the cost risk and this should be reß ected 
in appropriate level of the reasonable proÞ t. Van de Velde et al. (2008b) divides 
the operational cost risks into external and internal operational cost risks. External 
operational cost risks are the risks that cannot be inß uenced by the operator at 
all (e.g. costs increasing due to ß ooding streets in the event of natural disasters). 
Internal operational cost risks are the risks that can be inß uenced by the operator, 
e.g. the costs of maintaining of a vehicle ß eet (the operator can decide on the main-
tenance process in order to avoid failures of vehicles and higher costs).
Residual value risks are the risks that are related to the difference of the an-
ticipated life of the Þ xed assets of the operator (Stanley and van de Velde, 2008). 
While providing public passenger transport it is primarily the means of transport 
and infrastructure (e.g. bus and tram stops, tram tracks, and etc.). The reasonable 
proÞ t must depend on which party assumes the risk of the difference of the actual 
net book value of Þ xed assets at the end of the contract period and the anticipated 
net book value at the beginning of the contract period.
2.2. Revenue Risks
Revenue risks are associated with the difference between the expected reve-
nue and the revenue actually achieved at the end of the contract period. In the case 
of revenue risks, it is possible to deÞ ne inß uence of public authorities on revenue 
risks. According to Stanley and van de Velde (2008), these risks can be divided 
into two groups: demand risk and social policy risk.
Demand risk is the risk related to the changes in number of passengers car-
ried when providing public passenger transport. In the case that the authority as-
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sumes the revenue risk, it is necessary to appropriately involve the operator in 
compliance with the required quality because the amount of the compensation 
in this case does not depend on the number of passengers carried (van de Velde 
et al., 2008a). For example in Slovakia, this risk is very signiÞ cant because the 
demand for public passenger transport, expressed in passenger-kilometres (pskm), 
is decreasing annually in road and railway transport (Kone ný, 2011). According 
to Poliak et al. (2014), the performance decreased of 48 % in bus service and the 
performance decreased of 13.4 % in railway transport in the period from 2000 
to 2013. The development of number of carried passengers depends to some 
extent on the interventions of public authorities which can indirectly inß uence 
the number of passengers carried through a fulÞ lling their strategic objectives. 
The strategic objectives of public authorities can be divided by Stanley and van 
de Velde (2008) to economic (maximizing the effectiveness and efÞ ciency of 
resource use), environmental (minimizing the impact of transportation in the 
served area), social (ensuring possibility of mobility for all people, particularly 
for vulnerable groups of passengers) and public (planning transport policy and 
other policies in a region). 
The social policy risk is the risk of revenue changes because of changes in 
the passenger structure. For example, when the selected groups of passengers (stu-
dents, pensioners) travel with special fares, an increase in the number of those pas-
sengers while keeping the total number of passengers, causes a decrease in total 
revenue for providing transport services. The good solution is setting an appropri-
ate pricing policy of transport services. However, according to Gnap et al. (2006) 
it is important to monitor the impact of price changes on the demand which varies 
considerably for particular groups of passengers. Fares are regulated by public 
authorities that decide which speciÞ c groups of passengers will be entitled to the 
reduced fares; and therefore, the social policy risk can be also classiÞ ed as the risk 
associated with the interventions of public authorities.
Based on the above analysis, it can be stated that the most passengers leav-
ing a system of public passenger transport are those who have an option of other 
means of transport, mainly a passenger car. This group consists of the passengers 
travelling for full fare. According to Wallis et al. (2010) and Poliak (2013), pupils 
who usually do not have the option of travelling by a passenger car, and they are 
subjected to compulsory school attendance, remain as the users of public passen-
ger transport. Similarly in case of pensioners, the transition to individual motor-
ing is limited at present. Therefore, the need for increasing public funding can be 
expected because the current trend of increases in number of passengers travelling 
with special fares persists. These fares bring lower income for the operator in 
comparison with the full fares.
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3.  Risk Allocation between Contractual Parties and Its Impact on 
Public Passenger Transport Financing
According to Lalive, R., Schmutzler, A. (2008b), public authorities shall de-
cide on risk-taking before concluding public service contracts. Van de Velde et al. 
(2008a) distinguish between three possible cases of risk allocation and their cor-
responding types of contracts which are used in Western Europe.
In the Þ rst case, the operator assumes no risk. Cost and revenue risks are as-
sumed by the authority that pays the economically justiÞ ed costs to the operator. 
Those costs are accounted at the end of the contract period. This means that the 
risk from the difference between anticipated and actual costs is assumed by the 
authority which assumes also the risk from the difference between anticipated and 
actual revenue. In this case, the level of the reasonable proÞ t of the operator should 
relate only to the retain capital during providing transport services because he as-
sumes no risk. According to van de Velde et al. (2008a), the contracts within which 
the operator assumes no risks are called management contracts.
In the second case, the operator assumes cost risks. The operator assumes 
the risk from the difference between anticipated and actual costs at the end of 
the contract period. The authority assumes the risk from the difference between 
anticipated and actual revenue. In this case, the reasonable proÞ t must contain not 
only the retain capital but also the reward for assuming the cost risk. According to 
van de Velde et al. (2008a), the contracts within which the operator assumes only 
cost risks are called gross cost contracts. 
In the third case, the operator assumes cost as well as revenue risks. In this 
case, the operator assumes the risk from the difference between anticipated and 
actual costs/revenue which are identiÞ ed at the end of the contract period. The au-
thority pays the operator a compensation which is agreed before the performance 
realization. This means that the authority assumes no risks. The reasonable proÞ t 
must include the components related to the cost risks, revenue risks, and the retain 
capital. According to van de Velde et al. (2008a), the contracts within which the 
operator assumes both cost and revenue risks are called net cost contracts. 
Table 1 provides examples of cities where public service operators assume no 
risks or only cost risks (revenue risks are assumed by public authorities) or they 
assume both revenue and cost risks.
The analysis of the risk allocation between the operator and authority in the 
selected regions of Great Britain, France, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Italy, USA, Australia, and New Zealand shows that all the men-
tioned ways of the risk allocation can be found in practice (Hensher and Wallis, 
2005).
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Table 1
ALLOCATION OF COST OR REVENUE RISKS 










e No risks Lyon, Dijon
Cost risks
Krakow, Innsbruck, Rome, Dublin, Gifhorn, London, Oviedo, 
Elmshorn, Frankfurt, Halmstad, Munich, Stockholm, Warsaw
Revenue and 
cost risks
Amsterdam, Barcelona, Brussels, Budapest, Gifhorn, London, Parla, 
Porto, Santiago, Trieste, Greenland, Haarlem, Manchester, Sondrio, 
Sundsvall, Wittenberg
Source: van de Velde et al., (2008a) and Poliak et al., (2012)
4. Proposal of Methodology for Risk QuantiÞ cation  
Based on the analysis of the available resources, it is possible to identify the 
risks and also identify the way how to allocate them between contracting par-
ties. However, there is no methodology according to which it would be possible to 
quantify the risk which is assumed by an operator. Also, the recommendations of 
Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 require to pay the operator a compensation on the 
basis of risk-taking. But, there is no recommended methodology for risk quanti-
Þ cation. According to Hensher and Wallis (2005), a general rule applies that the 
higher risk is taken by an operator, the higher compensation is paid to the opera-
tor. For this reason, the authors proposed their own risk quantifying methodology 
according to a share of the risk which is assumed by the operator (as presented in 
the previous chapter). The methodology is applicable in any Member State of the 
European Union, mainly in case of the direct award of public service contracts. 
The methodology is also applicable in case of public procurement of transport ser-
vices because the public authority needs to assess the possibility of changing the 
level of risk-taking and corresponding Þ nancial remuneration for the operator. The 
proposed methodology gives public authorities necessary information.
In cases that the operator assumes no risks, all the risks associated with pro-
viding transport services are assumed only by the public authority. Therefore, the 
level of the reasonable proÞ t should relate only to capital used by the operator 
when providing transport services. A reward for capital provided by the operator 
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should depend on the proÞ tability level of capital invested in term deposits with 
guaranteed returns. The reasonable proÞ t in management contracts is calculated 
according to the following formula:
 P = CI · Cp (1)
where: 
P  – reasonable proÞ t (€)
CI  – capital invested by the operator in regard with providing transport services
C
p 
– capital proÞ tability3
In case that the operator assumes cost risks, the level of the reasonable proÞ t 
must consist of two parts: the reward for capital provided by the operator (the same 
as mentioned above) and the reward corresponding to the cost risks. The reason-





  –  values of particular cost items of the operator in unit expression
s
Ni
  –  the risk of estimated value of a particular cost item in percentage expression 
  from the value of the cost item
n  –  number of operator’s cost items
i  –  a particular cost item of the operator
Pf  –  performance
It is necessary to deÞ ne the way of risk determination of estimated values of 
individual cost items in relation to the reasonable proÞ t. The risk can be calculated 
by using the relationship for determination of safety surcharge to net premiums. 
Principle of the safety surcharge is based on the fact that number of insurance 
events is a binomial variable which can be approximated by a normal one and the 
risk premium is chosen in the extent of the standard deviation s (Cipra, 2006).
3   ProÞ tability is determined on the basis of treasury bond proÞ tability (e.g. according to notice of 
Agency for management of debt and liquidity)
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In case that the operator assumes cost and revenue risks, the level of the rea-
sonable proÞ t must consist of three parts: the reward for capital provided by the 
operator (mentioned above), the reward corresponding to the cost risk (mentioned 
above), and the reward corresponding to the revenue risk. The reasonable proÞ t is 
possible to determine according to the following formula:
    (3)
where: 
j – a particular group of passengers with the same fare level
m – number of passenger groups which are different by fare level
T
j
 – estimated revenue from a particular passenger group in unit expression
s
Tj
 – revenue risk of a particular passenger group expressed in percentages
Determination of the revenue risk is done by an analogous method such as in 
case of determination of the cost risk. The revenue risk is possible to determine at 
standard deviation level of an income change per individual groups of passengers 
in observed period.
By implementing the proposed methodology, the public authority is able to 
assess remuneration changes depending on the proportion of the risk transferred 
to the operator. This assessment can be done before concluding public service 
contracts. The methodology allows assessing the impact of transferring the chosen 
cost risks (e.g. changes in fuel prices) because it works with the individual cost 
items. This applies also in case of the revenue risk where each of the factors is 
assessed individually. The hypothesis is tested in the next chapter. The chapter 
processes a model of operator’s behaviour when the operator assumes all the risks 
associated with transport service provision.
The proposal for risk allocation distinguishes only between cost and revenue 
risks associated with transport service provision. However, other risks also arise in 
contracting between public authorities and service operators. These risks exist in 
case of any other commercial contracts. For example, there is the risk of inß ation 
or the risk associated with interest rate changes. Allocation of those risks between 
contracting parties must be solved in a public service contract.
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5.  Modelling of Operator’s Approach when Assuming Cost and 
Revenue Risk
From the position of public authorities that plan funds for providing public 
transport services, the net cost contracts appear to be most advantageous. Under 
this contract form, all the risks, cost and revenue, are assumed by the operator. 
The authority pays the operator a Þ nancial amount that is Þ xed determined at 
the beginning of the contract period and it is stated in the contract. In this case, 
the public transport services in a certain area are provided only by the selected 
operator/operators through a license. The system of licenses ensures saving funds 
expended by the public authority in public transport provision because the system 
excludes other unlicensed operators from the market. This increases the utiliza-
tion of provided transport services. Increasing utilization helps to increase revenue 
from providing transport services. This is associated with the reduced need for 
Þ nancial support from the public funds. Those operators have the option to set the 
level of fares because they also assume revenue risks. In the following mathemati-
cal model, the authors try to explain the operators’ approach in case that they as-
sumes all the risks. The authors verify the hypothesis that transferring all the risks 
to the operator is economically effective from the position of the authority. This 
method assumes lower costs of transport service provision or increase in the scope 
of transport services. Based on the analysis of the available resources, there are no 
authors who would speciÞ cally deal with the mathematical modelling of the risk in 
providing transport services. While processing the model, the authors of the paper 
used mathematical modelling of a price regulation and determination of a busi-
ness reasonable proÞ t in network industries, processed by Fendeková and Fendek 
(2010). The model is derived from microeconomic theory. The mathematical cost 
modelling applicable to providing public transport services can be also found in 
the studies of Zhanbirov and Kenzhegulova (2012) and Sharma and Swami (2012).
Under net cost contracts, the operators assume not only cost risk but also rev-
enue risk related to transport service provision. The authority grants a license for 
providing public transport services to the operator that is then entitled to provide 
public transport services in a given area with the exclusion of other operators (dur-
ing the license period). As follows from the analysis processed by van de Velde 
et al. (2008a), the net cost contracts are rarely awarded as route contracts because 
the operator determines a fare level and he becomes a monopoly for providing 
public transport services in a given area during the licence period. The following 
mathematical model deÞ nes a procedure of such operator in relation to providing 
transport services.
We assume that the operator is a company that aims to make a proÞ t. Based 
on the license and the public service contract – the net cost contract, the operator 
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provides a range of transport services bounded by demand of q. We start from a 
general assumption, which is acceptable in any type of the market structure, the 
consumption of a product offered in the market is described by a price-demand 
function that expresses willingness of a consumer to buy q units of services pro-
vided at given price - p.
                   p = p(q) (4)
Technological conditions of the operator are expressed through the real cost 
function:
                                                   n = n(q)   (5)
The equation presents the amount of minimum costs of n which are spent 
by a producer in the production of q units of goods, while it is assumed that the 
price-demand function p(q) is a continuous and twice differentiable real function. 
It is also envisaged that the price-demand function of a consumer is constructed in 
order to clearly motivate the consumer to buy q units of services at market price 
– p because the consumer feels the maximum rate of usefulness from consumer’s 
strategy realization in this combination of price and demand. Analogously, the 
cost function describes a process of providing services by the operator so that 
quantiÞ es the minimum of total production cost – n for an optimal combination of 
production factors required to produce q units of provided services.
While optimal consumer behaviour is described by the price-demand func-
tion p(q), the optimal operator behaviour is described by a proÞ t function p(q) 
which is formulated as the difference between revenue and costs of a company 
corresponding to a certain production volume of q:
                                          p(q) = r(q) – n(q)  (6)
Where a continuous and twice differentiable real function of company rev-
enue r(q) is deÞ ned as the product of price and supply volume, i.e.:
                                        r(q) = p · q = p(q) · q  (7)
A company operating in every type of the market structure (a competitive 
company as well as a monopoly) seeks in a decision-making process such a com-
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bination of price and supply of its product that guarantees a maximum level of the 
proÞ t. This means that the operator also provides transport services in such a way 
that ensures the maximum proÞ t. Analytically, this approach can be expressed as 
follows:
(8)
For optimizing the proÞ t function, it is necessary that the function would 
reach its maximum at certain point of supply - q, i.e. that the Þ rst derivative of the 
proÞ t function at this point is zero:
  (9)
In the equation (9),  rm(q) is a marginal revenue function of the operator and 
nm(q) is a marginal cost function. Based on (9), it can be seen that a company gen-
erally achieves a maximum proÞ t for a volume of (q) when the marginal revenue 
equals to the marginal costs, i.e. a solution to the equation:
  (10)
Then, it is possible to calculate such a price – p
p
 that maximises proÞ t of the 




In the case of the operator who operates in a non-regulated sector (e.g. long-
distance transport), where the competition exists, the approach described in previ-
ous relationships (equations) cannot be applied. The operator accepts the price - p
K
 
at the level of his marginal costs and he offers the production volume - q
K
 at that 
price (Fendekova and Fendek, 2010). This means that the following relationship 
applies:
  (12)
On the other hand, due to its dominant position in the market a monopoly 
can inß uence the price of its product to achieve a higher proÞ t in comparison with 
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competing companies. The monopoly determines an optimal price - P
M
 based on 
the optimization solution (8) and based on relationships (10), (11), that is:
(13)
Based on above mentioned, the operator operating in a monopoly position 
can provide fewer services at a higher price compared to competitors. The ap-
proach is shown in Figure 2 based on which the following applies:
  
(14)
It can be concluded based on Figure 2 that the operator operating in the com-
petitive market would provide services in a volume of q
K
 at the price - p
K
 . If the 
average unit costs per unit of provided services are deÞ ned as:
(15)
Then the price of provided services will not cover even the average costs of 
the operator because:
(16)
If the operator provides public transport services in such a case, the loss of 
the operator will be at the level of (according to the equation (8)):
(17)
If the operator acted as a monopoly in the same market, he would provide 
public transport services at the level of q
M
 at price - p
M
 and he would achieve, under 
these conditions, a proÞ t - p
M
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Figure 2 
MONOPOLY AND COMPETITIVE COMPANY
Source: processing by authors
And the following applies for the monopoly:
(19)
If the public authority transfers cost and revenue risks to the operator and 
the operator assumes the risk associated with the decrease in the number of pas-
sengers, he will have to obtain a possibility to operate the entire network of public 
passenger transport in a given area. This position may be ensured by the public 
authority through granting a license. Thus, the operator becomes the only service 
operator in a certain territory during a certain time period. The mathematical 
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model shows that the model does not give a cost-effective solution to the public 
authority in case that the operator may change the fare level as well as planning 
of individual lines. The operator will provide lower performance as compared to 
competitive provision of transport services by more operators with the same re-
muneration paid from the position of the public authority. If the transport services 
are ensured by several operators, it is not right to delegate the revenue risk to the 
operators, because it would be problematic for the public authority to deÞ ne par-
ticular operator’s share of responsibility for the revenue risk.
The mathematical model shows that the hypothesis is not correct. The con-
tract, within which the public authority transfers all risks to the operator, is not 
generally more advantageous than the contract through which the authority would 
create a competitive environment and the authority would assume revenue risk.
6. Conclusion
A public authority can decide which form of a public service contract will 
use when providing public passenger transport. One of the possibilities is to use 
a gross cost contract according to which the authority assumes revenue risks. 
Another possibility is to negotiate a net cost contract within which the authority is 
responsible for no risk (neither revenue nor cost risk) besides the contractually es-
tablished Þ nancial contribution. A negotiation of the net cost contract may appear 
to be most appropriate from the perspective of the public authority. By using this 
type of contract, it is easier to plan the public budget because the Þ xed Þ nancial 
contribution (reward), which is paid by the authority, is determined in the contract. 
The aim of the paper was to assess the impact of individual contract types on pub-
lic authorities and the provision of public passenger transport. Also, the hypothesis 
that the most advantageous contract from the perspective of public authorities is a 
net cost contract was tested. Based on the model developed in this paper, it must be 
held that the net cost contract cannot be considered as the most advantageous con-
tract type from the perspective of public authorities. Mathematical model showed 
that if the operator ensures transport services in speciÞ c area as the only operator 
(a monopoly), there is an assumption that he will be ensuring lower performance 
(number of kilometres) and for the higher price for passengers in comparison with 
the market where more operators operate. On the other hand, if the public a uthor-
ity enables more operators operating in the market, (e.g. it allocates the lines be-
tween operators) it is not possible to transfer revenue risk to the operators.
The proposed model is applicable in the system of public passenger transport 
where a public authority awards exclusive rights for providing services (a license) 
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to a service operator. In EU conditions, such a system concerns mainly urban pas-
senger transport and suburban transport. By awarding a license, the public service 
operator acts as a monopoly because other operators (without the license) are ex-
cluded from the market of public passenger transport. The public authority is also 
able to reduce (restrict) individual car transport by using trafÞ c restrictions. The 
proposed methodology has minor use in the national or international transport 
serviceability where licenses are awarded to several service operators.
The contribution of this paper is a proposal of own methodology by which 
the risk transferred to an operator can be quantiÞ ed. Before contract conclusion, 
the public authority can verify the effectiveness of the expected remuneration in 
relation to the quantiÞ ed risk that the authority transfers to the operator. The ap-
plication of this methodology will help public authorities to decide which type of a 
public service contract is more advantageous in its own conditions.
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ALOKACIJA RIZIKA U UGOVORIMA O USLUGAMA U JAVNOM PROMETU
Sažetak
U ovom se radu analiziraju rizici sadržani u ugovorima o uslugama u javnom prome-
tu, i njihov utjecaj na Þ nanciranje prometnih usluga od strane javne uprave . Rad provjera-
va hipotezu je li ugovor sa neto troškovima najpovoljniji ugovor sa stanovišta javne uprave. 
Kod takvog tipa ugovora javne vlasti ne preuzimaju rizik u odnosu na pružanje prometnih 
usluga. Rad tako er analizira rizike do kojih dolazi za vrijeme korištenja prometne usluge. 
Rizici se dijele u  rashodne  i dobitne rizike. Rad predlaže postupak za kvantiÞ kaciju tih 
rizika i predlaže izra un modela za Republiku Slova ku. 
Klju ne rije i: promet, Þ nanciranje, rizik, faktori,  regija, javne službe
